PODCAST TRANSCRIPT: What’s at stake for Palestinian citizens in Israel’s election?

 

This transcript was generated using an AI transcription service and lightly edited for readability. Please consult the corresponding audio before quoting.

[music]

Leena Dallasheh

“People are understanding what Palestinians fought for in the ‘50s and ‘60s, which is how to create a substantive Palestinian citizenship within Israel—one that is not only formal, in which we are paraded to the polls and photographed for the world to see Israel’s liberalism without any guarantees or even protections, let alone rights.” 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

Welcome to the +972 podcast, your direct line to the journalists, thinkers, and activists struggling for justice in Israel-Palestine.

Our podcast grounds the discussion in lived realities to bring you closer to the issues that matter most between the river and the sea.

+972 is independent and reader funded. If our work matters to you, become a member or donate at 972mag.com/members.

I am Dikla Taylor-Sheinman, editor at +972 magazine and your host for today’s episode.

Israel’s Palestinian citizens are approaching an election in which their votes could be decisive in bringing down the most far-right government in Israel’s history. And yet, the Jewish-Israeli politicians vying to replace Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, figures like Gadi Eizenkot, Naftali Bennett, and Yair Lapid, have either ruled out governing with Palestinian parties or set conditions that effectively exclude them from any future coalition. 

If that contradiction raises questions about how much political power Palestinian voters can actually wield, Israel’s political establishment offered an even more humiliating illustration of the limits of their participation in practice, forcing Sami Abu Shehadeh, chairman of the Palestinian Party Balad, which makes up one-third of the Joint List, to drop out of the race. The pretext was an article he published the day after October 7, in which he attempted to analyze the Hamas-led attack and its historical significance without yet explicitly condemning the killing of civilians, something he has done countless times since. 

At the same time, dozens of far-right Jewish politicians have faced no such repercussions for calling for the annihilation of Gaza. Of course, the ethical dilemma of Palestinian electoral participation is much older than this election. 

Palestinians who remained within the borders of the state after 1948 have lived through a series of defining historical turning points. The Nakba, military rule, the Kafr Qasim massacre, the 1967 war, Land Day, Oslo, and the killings of October 2000. Each of these events in different ways reshaped the relationship to the Israeli state, to the wider Palestinian people, and to their own sense of political possibility. 

Are we living through another historical turning point? How have the past three years of genocide in Gaza, ethnic cleansing in the West Bank, and a sweeping crackdown on political expression within the Green Line changed what it means to be a Palestinian in Israel? And as Israel consolidates its control over all of the land between the river and the sea, what future can Palestinians imagine for themselves and for the Palestinian people as a whole? 

I’m here in Haifa today with Dr. Leena Dallasheh to grapple with these very questions. A historian of modern Palestine and Israel, Leena’s work focuses on the political and social history of Palestinian citizens of Israel, and her forthcoming book with Stanford University Press, Struggling for the City, tells the story of how Palestinians in Nazareth navigated the transition from British to Israeli rule. Leena, thank you so much for being with me here on the +972 podcast. 

Leena Dallasheh

Thank you for having me. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

So maybe we can start with kind of the current emotional climate around the disqualification of Sami Abu Shehadeh. And I don’t want this to be just another elections podcast, God forbid, but I think it’s kind of a useful place for starting this conversation. So there was a pretty spirited debate among Palestinian intellectuals and legal scholars over whether he should withdraw his candidacy to avoid giving the court an opportunity to establish a precedent or to fight the disqualification. And then there was also the question of whether he should have apologized for writing the article in the first place. So I wanted to ask you, where did you fall in this debate, if you had an opinion? And also, what do you make of the court’s recommendation that he withdraw, which he ultimately accepted? 

 

Leena Dallasheh

I fell on the side that he should have gone to court. I was disappointed that he decided to withdraw after going to court. I get why, and I’m assuming he had solid legal advice for it, but I think lawyer Reham Nasra put it really, really well in her argument that we should use all arenas for struggle, and we should make our stance very clear. So I think it was a good idea to press the court. The court proceedings were exactly what everyone would have expected. It wasn’t a surprise. 

This is a right-wing court in a state that has taken to fascism in every aspect of it. So I wasn’t expecting the court to go easy on him, but I also would have wanted to see this pursued. I know the risk is huge and I agree with, for instance, Professor Raef Zreik on his analysis, his caution from the court setting a precedent. But I think it would have also been very hard for the court to set that precedent. Because as populist as everything in the political system in Israel is, this would have been one step too far, maybe another nail in the dying bits of democracy, even for Jews alone, that Israel has pretended to be. 

I understand also the position that Sami Abu Shehadeh was in. I’m personally critical of the article. I think it was in the sweeping moment, but it also didn’t, I think, take as much seriously as it should have been, the spirit that was in the moment. I mean, not only that Israelis were in complete shock, but also that Gaza was about to be devastated. Because I think for any of us who have been following that government closely, what was coming was obvious. I mean, to be honest, I did not foresee that it was going to be a genocide that lasts three years, and that would kill 70,000 people. 

But I think it was very easy to foresee tens of thousands being killed and Gaza being devastated. I think that there was a miscalculation in the article. That’s not a reason to muzzle someone, to overstep their freedom of speech. That is what democracy is about. There was nothing inciting. There was nothing legally wrong about that article. 

There is no possibility to claim it is. And in the end, Sami Abu Shehadeh was put in a situation where he had to apologize or explain it to a court that eventually hears whatever it wants to hear.I mean, to me, to my mind, one of the things that jumped to my mind is a very important precedent of the Supreme Court from 1965, which is the case of Al-Ard Movement. And we can talk more about Al Ard Movement, but in the discussion, which was the last-ditch attempt of Al-Ard to work within the constraints of the Israeli system. They actually tried to establish a party with Jewish political activists and the court basically in both decisions about the association and about the party. It basically said, yes, you’re telling us you’re not denying Israel’s existence, but really what you mean is, and that’s exactly what the court did with Sami Abu Shehadeh. Maybe you didn’t say this, but that’s really what you meant, because we, the colonialist system, can understand the native better than they can understand themselves. 

We can be the ones who actually translate the natives to themselves and to the world. And that’s exactly what happened. And to me, though, it’s a part of the reason why we should be more determined to fight in all the possible arenas, to actually show them that you can take out Sami Abu Shehadeh, but you can’t take out the ideas, not Tajammu’s ideas and not the Joint List’s ideas. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

Yeah, that’s an interesting takeaway from the whole episode because I think part of what’s interesting about the timing of the whole Abu Shehadeh affair is that over the past several months, I want to say over the past half a year, a growing number of Palestinian intellectuals and public figures — I’m thinking of Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, Awad Abdelfattah, you know, have — these are people who have advocated boycotting the elections in the past and these figures have kind of begun publicly announcing their intention to vote, so I wanted to ask how you make sense of this kind of renewed interest in electoral participation, and how much you actually think is at stake for Palestinian citizens in this coming election. 

 

Leena Dallasheh

To start with, I’ll say that I’ve never called for a boycott. I’ve always had an issue with boycott because you take yourself out of the arena. You actually take the very little power, one of the very few places where you have a little power, and you give it away. I mean, when Netanyahu panicked about the Arabs that were going and drove to the ballots, there was a reason. Our power has scared the institution, and I’m not saying electoral politics is the whole story; it never should be. But as I’ve been campaigning in these elections, it is the minimum. It is the least you can do. It’s literally like an hour of your damn day to go and face the evil that we are facing, and we are facing evil, and we are facing a very, very serious, well-structured, very coordinated campaign by the Israeli extreme right to ethnically cleanse us. I mean, it starts with the West Bank, but it does not end there. If you look at Bezalel Smotrich’s campaign right now and his party, the whole campaign is, we’re going to do in the Galilee and in the Naqab what we did in the West Bank. 

 

He literally writes it in these words. And what does Smotrich have planned? We know because he published in 2017 his decisive plan. And the decisive plan is basically an exclusion of Palestinians as a collective entity from the land and as individuals. For him, the ideal is as few Palestinians as possible and those who remain are basically subjects to the state, at its mercy. 

We are facing that. He has proven that he is able to deliver on his plans. He is systematic, he’s meticulous, and he’s vicious, and he’s not the only one. I mean, Itamar Ben-Gvir is much more populist in certain ways and waves around, but he’s also effective. Look at the prisons. Look at the hell that he has created. 

This week, Hagar Shezaf’s article in Haaretz, the research that B’Tselem and Physicians for Human Rights have published about the situation in prisons shows us that Ben-Gvir has been able to change the culture in the prison system. He’s been able to change the culture in the police system. So we have a lot at stake. It is a crucial election campaign, and I don’t say that lightly. 

I will say that I did say that in the last elections, or not to this extreme, but I begged people to go out and vote. I said, listen, for me, the core of the argument last time was, if you don’t want to vote for yourself, vote for the Palestinians in the occupied territories who don’t have a vote because they need defense. Because if these people come to power, the Palestinians in the occupied territories are going to be under massive, massive pressure. And that’s what exactly happened. Within a month of the elections, basically, the government’s coalition agreement already set the map for massive dispossession of the Palestinians, for ethnic cleansing, for destruction, demolition, land confiscation, expansion of settlements—all these things long before October 7, by the way. So October 7 just gave them that opportunity. October 7th is the miracle, as Orit Strook called it, that actually allowed them to work much more freely without international pressure and without really an ability of the Palestinians to resist. But this was already on the table long before October 7. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

You’ve been on a bit of a podcast role lately, both on Local Call’s podcast with Meron Rapoport and Al-Midan’s podcast with Abed Abu Shehadeh in Hebrew and Arabic respectively. You suggested that today we’re seeing something reminiscent of the two-decade period of draconian military rule that most Palestinian citizens were subjected to between 1948 and 1966, which is also a central subject, if not the subject of your forthcoming book on Nazareth that I mentioned in the introduction. And so I wanted to ask if you can explain for our listeners where you see the parallels today, and also maybe take us back to ‘48, to ‘66, and walk us through what it actually means for Palestinians to be living under military rule. 

Leena Dallasheh

So I’m going to start with the history just so that I can show the parallels. But the military government, which was imposed on Palestinian citizens, most of them, almost 90 percent, in October 1948, and before they were citizens, and lasted until December 1966, put everything in Palestinians’ life under the mercy of the military government. It meant military courts, not civilian courts. It meant that you needed a permit from the military governor to go anywhere. It meant that the military governor can announce curfews, closed military zones, take over your land, banish you, arrest you without trial. 

It was basically a complete control and surveillance of Palestinians’ lives, daily lives, and putting them at the mercy of this structure, this, you know, personified by the military governor, but it is a massive structure that just controlled every aspect of life. It prevented the development or tried to prevent the development of a political Palestinian movement, independent Palestinian political movement. It curtailed Palestinian economy. It manipulated Palestinians’ needs for the political use of the ruling party. 

And in some ways, it might sound familiar to the listeners because this is the same military regime that was then transferred to the West Bank. It’s literally the same structure, including the same people in many cases, that were moved, so it was shut down in December 1966 inside Israel. It was fully transferred to the West Bank in June 1967 and has continued to function since then. 

So if you think about this system that I just described, and you think about the moment after October 7, what happens? Immediately after, the Palestinians are told you are being surveilled, right? Those arrests over Instagram posts, those universities that actually suspended or expelled their students, those workplaces that fired Palestinians, this was the hint that in the digital age, in which we can surveil you much more easily and also much more subtly, and part of my argument is that even though there is not a lot of awareness among the younger generation about the military government, there is the generational trauma that is a part of our story, a part of our life. So even though people didn’t know the details, they were familiar with the fear. They knew from their grandparents that you should be afraid, that the authorities can harm you, that they can deprive you of your livelihood, that they can take your freedom. And it was, in fact, that. 

So the control comes both in what historian Shira Robinson talks about as the “spectacles of sovereignty,” and I talk about the “spectacles of control,” right? So the state actually shows you. Ben-Gvir’s choice to blindfold Palestinians and put them in front of the flag, that’s an intentional, deliberate thing, not only to diminish and demean the Palestinians, but also to show who’s the boss. He uses this language, who’s the landlord, who’s the boss, all the time. And that’s a part of the control. 

And Palestinians retreated with that immediately because they understood this, because it spoke to this inherited trauma. But then the police actually went on to actually enforce it. The state went on to enforce it over and over and over again, preventing demonstrations. If you remember, in the first month, Barakeh and a few others were arrested as they were going to a demonstration, preemptively. That’s something that was like in the core of the military government’s toolbox. 

Every time the Palestinians, particularly the Communist Party, which was the main political actor, every time they tried to do something, to organize an event, the day before the military government would go and round them up and either arrest them or banish them. 

And there was that event that was supposed to happen early on by Lajnat Al-Mutaba’a, by the High Follow-Up Committee. And police actually went to the proprietor of the venue that they were supposed to have it and threatened them. That’s also something that they had from the military government years. This was like a very used trick. 

But imagine how effective it needs to be for someone, for this to have a resonance, for the proprietor to think they can actually do it. Right? I mean, and the reason it works, I think, is because it has a precedent, because it has been done. Because if you think about it, in the past, like, 30 years, that hasn’t happened. It’s not a part of, you know, what a democratic state does. 

But somehow, immediately, it resonated. And the higher-up committee didn’t even go and try to find another venue. They switched it to Zoom because they understood this is going to be effective. And we spent, I mean, I feel extremely, extremely disappointed at myself, at my community, that we took this long to actually go out to the street, to protest the genocide as it was ongoing. I don’t judge others, but I definitely judge myself. But I also, as a historian who understands this history and understands the way this history played out in this process, I also understand how it was so easy for the state to devastate us. 

I mean, it comes also with socioeconomic changes and what one might call the bourgeoisification of the Palestinians. I mean, there’s now a very solid middle class that has a lot to lose. And the state definitely used that. You know, the doctors who were fired, the doctors who were persecuted, that’s not coincidental. The journalists who were beaten up and imprisoned, the lawyer in Umm al-Fahm in the first month. Targeting people from the middle class is also a part of this signaling that says you have a lot to lose, and we will hit you where it hurts. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

Yeah, what you referred to as the bourgeoisification of Palestinian society is definitely something that I want to get into a bit later in the interview, but maybe we’ll back up really quickly because you alluded to the Communist Party as kind of one of the principal political formations for Palestinian citizens of Israel in the early years of the state. And I think one of the things that’s quite interesting about this history is all of the various political strategies that Palestinians developed in Israel in response to the Nakba and in response to their kind of sudden status as a minority within Israel. So maybe you can help us kind of understand how these different currents emerged and what the kind of major disagreements were between them. 

Leena Dallasheh

Okay, so now I’m going to take us even further back, because a part of the argument in my book and my research in general is that in order to understand the Palestinians who become citizens in Israel, we have to actually look at their history as one that doesn’t start or end in 1948, as the literature tends to do, right? There’s this idea that comes, that there’s all of a sudden, there’s this thing called Arab Israelis, who are detached from the land and from the Palestinian-ness and from their history. And the fact is that that thing, the Arab Israelis, was a creation of the Israeli security apparatus because it wanted to disconnect us from our history, from our claim to the land. And it was possible to continue this narrative because this history started from ‘48. And what my research says is that yes, the Nakba is a devastating, shattering event that ended Palestinian history in one unit, in one geographic unit. 

That is, there is no question. 750,000 Palestinians became refugees. That’s earth shattering. That is the majority of the Palestinians. So the Nakba is an earth shattering event in massive scales, but that does not mean that Palestinian history ended; there is continuity, and my research looks at the 40s and 50s to show that there is continuity in the ways that Palestinians define themselves, in the ways that Palestinians developed political struggles, and it is within that understanding that you can understand the Communist Party. 

The Communist Party was very active in the 1940s. The Communist Party dates back to 1924. It was established by Jews who came as part of the Zionist movement, were disillusioned, went out and created a communist party, were demanded to turn into, to do Arabization, what it was called, because it was, it needed to be a mass party, and the masses were Palestinians. This is how Palestinians got involved in it. But by the 1940s, they were a significant part of it. They broke with the Jewish communists and established their own movement called the National Liberation League. 

And between ‘43 and ‘48, they functioned as an independent unit that did a lot of political struggle. And their struggle and others, including the elites, was based on combining the idea of citizenship and identity. So they insisted, even though they understood that it’s colonial citizenship under the British mandate, they insisted that their identity, their citizenship, the state must basically respect the promise of citizenship, and that the citizenship is rooted in their Palestinian-ness, that their collective Palestinian-ness makes the state responsible to give them collective rights. And under colonial rule, Palestinians mobilized other things, right? There was armed struggle, and there were strikes, and there were all these different things. But one of the tools that they had used was mobilizing citizenship for advancing their rights with a full awareness that this is a limited colonial citizenship, right?

They literally write it. I have a leaflet that I cite in my book by the League of Intellectuals, which is one of the communist organizations, where they say, you know, straightforward, like, you know, this is a limited citizenship, but we will use it. We will vote in the municipal elections in order to make the municipality our champion for rights towards Palestinian liberation. So these people, the communists in Nazareth and in other parts of the country, end up being almost the only political force left following the Nakba, because one of the things in the Nakba was that the political class, what is called the political class, the urban educated political leadership, all became refugees. And it is within this context that they then go and build on what they’ve already been doing, on the discourse and strategies that insist on our Palestinian-ness, on our right to citizenship, and on a citizenship that actually is based on our Palestinian identity and they safeguard that and they’re not the only ones active and there are some other forces that mostly are not able to build any frameworks because the government cracks down on any attempt to build any other political organization but the communists are protected as an entity by the fact that they were a joint Jewish-Arab party and the government had a much harder time outlawing it, even though Ben-Gurion definitely wanted to, the then prime minister. So there are other attempts to create some political formations. Elias Kousa, a well-known lawyer from Haifa, for instance, tried to establish the Arab Party, which doesn’t really go anywhere, with some of the local elites from Haifa and other parts. 

But more significantly, there’s Al-Ard Movement, which was established in 1959, which was a movement of its time. This is the Pan-Arabist moment, the Nasserist moment, and they’re very much in that discourse. Even though, as I argue in my article about them, in the daily, day-to-day demands, in the things that they are asking for, they’re very, very similar to the communists, but they use a very Nasserite, Pan-Arabist discourse, and the state is able to quash them in part because of that. As I mentioned, they then basically go and tell them what they really mean, right, when they say these things. And they outlaw them in 1964. 

1965 is the Supreme Court appeal trying to run as a party. And after that, the persecution gets so bad that some of its members end up leaving the country, and Sabri Jiryis goes to Beirut and establishes the Israel Studies Center as a part of the PLO. Habib Qahwaji goes to Syria and also establishes a research center, but also some of its members end up going to jail for a very long time, like Salih Baransi, which is, again, another moment where Israel is able to quash, to start—actually a body that lasts until today. And I want to clarify that the communists were able to act legally, but it doesn’t mean they were also not under the very strong arm of the military government. They were arrested, they were fired, they were harassed, they were intimidated, banished—all these things that all Palestinians were subject to, but they still had a legal framework that they could function within. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

The case of Al-Ard is really fascinating. I’m glad that you brought it up. In one of the articles that you wrote about them, you recall this episode in which they’re trying basically to obtain a license to publish a newspaper, and they try and do this under Israel’s press ordinance, and months go by, and the district commissioner is stalling, he’s stalling, and they have to get really creative. And so they basically, as you write, take advantage of this loophole in the mandate, the British mandatory law, which says that you can publish single-issue newspapers. And so they basically released like 13 issues of this newspaper, all with different titles that have the word Al-Ard in it, Kifah Al-Ard, Sarkhat Al-Ard, Al-Ard Al-Taybeh, and different editors’ names. 

And it’s something that I checked these newspapers out of the National Library, I was very curious. And it’s quite amazing, like the graphics and everything. I don’t know, I was very, very struck by this episode because clearly, they went to great lengths to try and operate legally. They had a good command of Israeli law. And the state treated them as this crazy, radical security threat from within. So what is that episode, and particularly also this need to be hyper-creative among Palestinian citizens of Israel, what does it tell us about the conditions under which Palestinian political organizing developed in Israel? 

Leena Dallasheh 

Yeah, I mean, there was a bunch of law students in that group, and so they use their education well. This is a lesson to how important education is. But yes, I mean, and again, this wasn’t new, right? Palestinians have been doing this, have been dealing with a colonial system since 1917. They’ve been having to find these loopholes to redefine, to redirect, to rework their struggles. And in the 50s and 60s, it’s under British mandate laws, 1946 emergency regulations, that the structure is happening, and they have to work within that, and they try very hard. 

Now, they’re also very aware how small they are. We’re talking about 156,000 out of the 1.2 million Palestinians who were part of historic Palestine only a few years ago. We’re talking about people who witnessed and lived the Nakba, many of whom have lost family members who were either killed or expelled and could not come back. This is people who’ve literally watched their people get shattered, and they have to collect their lives, Israel is still trying to expel them. The expulsion continues until 1959 in the Naqab but even in other parts. And the Palestinians know it. They are not safe in their place, and they have to constantly try to fight it. 

One of the cases — that one day I hope to write more about — that I found in the court is this Mukhtar of Ilut. Ilut was depopulated. They escaped to Nazareth. They were able to return, but this guy somehow gets picked up by the army. They throw him over the border in Jordan. He sneaks back in. They catch him again. They throw him over the border. He sneaks back in. He gets to the Supreme Court eventually, having been thrown back and forth like three times already, and he fights, and he actually gets from the court an approval to stay. He proves that he was there in the deciding date, and the court actually allows him to stay. It’s one of the rare cases where people actually win that court case. But people do this. People have to hold on, right? 

Like this idea of staying put, al-baqa’, this idea of staying at home becomes so central, not only as a survival mechanism, but I argue, as a political strategy. For Palestinians, nationalism, for the Palestinians who remain at their home, a part of their nationalism becomes staying in Palestine, staying at their home. And they do all these things to try to find ways to kind of get rooted. And initially, you know, I’m not, I don’t have this romantic notion of like revolutionary, you know, fight that is what we want it to be, right? Like we want things to be radical and we want people to be pure. There is no such thing. 

People are not heroes or traitors. The opposite of resistance or the other side of resistance is not treason. There is a whole range of ways in which people do live and act in order to do what they understand as the best for them and for their nation, right? Like if you understand al-baqa’, if you accept that al -baqa’ is a part of your national goal, then doing things for that is complicated, right? And it’s not an issue of, you know, point of view, right? If someone actually harms his neighbors in service of the state, if someone, you know, sells his land or even worse, his neighbor’s land to the state or things like that, that’s not a part of what I’m talking about. 

There is a margin of that. You know, Hillel Cohen wrote about this group, but I’m talking about the rest who are trying to do. And there are people who are, you know, standing in the front and putting their life on the line, the communists and Al-Ard and other nationalists. 

So there is a lot of organizing work, right? It’s painstaking. It’s painful. It’s very expensive, personal price for a lot of people. I mean, if you think about Nimr Murkus or Abu-Hanna, who were fired as teachers, all these people who, you know, couldn’t provide for their families, the people who are arrested, tortured, all these things. But there is, you know, an organization, a daily practice of trying to find and create the spaces for organizing, which unfortunately we have lost. 

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Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

So we’ve talked a lot about the communists, about Al Ard, about Abnaa al-Balad, which comes in the 70s, which we could say maybe sort of has some similar political leanings to Al-Ard. And then today we have Hadash, we have Balad. I think, I feel that there’s a bit of a tendency on the left to kind of talk about Balad or Tajammu, and Hadash, Jabha in Arabic, which are kind of secular, progressive Palestinian-led parties who are running with the Joint List in the current election, as though they represent kind of a model larger share of the Palestinian society in Israel than they actually do. And, you know, we have Mansour Abbas’s Ra’am, for example, which embodies a kind of totally different politics, which emphasizes, you know, budgets and municipal services. 

Leena Dallasheh
And religion. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

And religion, crucially, and the possibility of also just kind of extracting all of these things through cooperation with Zionist parties. So I wonder if you can help us kind of like understand the appeal of this approach, and also to kind of assess its limitations, its achievements. 

Leena Dallasheh 

There’s an argument among Palestinian intellectuals, and not everyone agrees with my analysis, but I think not enough credit is given to the Islamic aspect of Ra’am. And I think that’s a part of its appeal. People try to explain it as the pragmatist money aspect, but I think that if you look at the case of tahini, for those who don’t know, right before one of the rounds of the elections, when we had the five elections in a row. There was this supposed scandal that a Palestinian tahini company had given money to an LGBTQ organization, and it became this massive contention among Palestinians. The secular parties, of course, backed and supported the company. Ra’am was livid. 

But they literally went on then to make a whole elections campaign among Palestinians—maybe not in public, but definitely we all heard about going to houses and literally saying ‘tahini’ as like, you know, a key word, like a kind of a, I don’t know, a dog whistle for what this election is about. And the tahini happened to be a part of a larger thing, which is the conversion law that the Jewish conservative parties were trying to push and which Jabhat and Tajammu actually voted against and Ra’am voted for. That also happened within that context, right? So the social aspect of their program is important, I think, and it needs more attention. But beside that, we also have to understand them as a part of, I think, several moments, right? 

This conjuncture comes within the framework of the rise of Islamism in the Arab world, right? that comes at the tails of the failure of the revolutionary Arab nationalist project. That starts in 67 but kind of escalates with the neoliberalization of the late 1970s and 80s. And Islamism becomes very strong and very appealing, and it is backed by Gulf money, by oil money, to create structures of assistance, and to basically fill in, in the Arab world, where the state fails—in social institutions, schools, social support, all these things; they’re able to create it and in a certain way here as well. 

I mean, Israel encourages the Islamic movement in the West Bank and inside Israel as a counterweight to the Palestinian national movement, and that’s a part of their power base. But it also falls within an increasingly neoliberal world in which individualism is very, very strong. And that, wedded with the crisis of the Palestinian national movement creates a very fertile ground for them. 

Right now, the Palestinian national movement is in shambles. I mean, it’s not even that you don’t have a unified political movement. We actually don’t have a unified vision right now of what the Palestinian political project is. So for Palestinians who are citizens of Israel, people can easily look at this and think, well, you know, I can work for my own interests, for my narrow interests. And I mean, it was preceded by Oslo, right? Oslo in a certain way, I mean, we don’t call it that but Oslo in a certain way, was a betrayal of the Palestinian citizens, right? Because it proved that neither the PLO nor Israel cared about us. We didn’t feature into this, into what the solution is. And still, Palestinians were gung-ho for it. I remember the euphoria. I mean, I was a kid, I remember the euphoria. 

My cousin was born on September 13 and was actually named Salam. And she’s not the only one, right? Like Palestinians, they didn’t care. They didn’t even think about it. It took a few years for the Palestinian citizens to realize we’re out, and we have to figure it out. And this is where the future vision documents come in. 

But following the Second Intifada, that crisis and our place within that crisis becomes very, very clear, right? I mean, 13 Palestinian citizens or 12 and one more who was killed inside Israel are killed by the police. And again, we don’t fit in the narrative of the armed resistance in the occupied territories or of Israel. I think this conjuncture of all these factors kind of leads to this return to a pragmatism, one might call it, of survival. Now it’s not called survival, it’s called prospering, but it hinges to those people who were a part of the satellite parties in the 1950s and 60s who were basically you know, literally, they were called satellite.

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman
Right, when you say satellite parties, you mean like… 

Leena Dallasheh
So this is the parties, the Zionist parties did not allow Palestinians to be part of them. Ma’pam gave that up earlier, but with Ma’pai it stayed for much longer so that Palestinians were represented in these parties that Ma’pai created for Palestinians that were sectarian based and kind of like, you know, fostered what they called traditional leadership, which is not traditional. There’s a lot of critical literature about that. But they were able to create these parties as a way to kind of get the Palestinians’ votes without having Palestinians in the parties. And those parties functioned as mediators, right, mediaries. And that’s not a new concept, that’s a very, very rooted colonial practice of creating mediaries who basically are a part of the indigenous populations or the colonized populations who get to benefit from their connection with the state, they’re co -opted by the state, they get to benefit from their connection to the state, and then they use these benefits and they’re able to distribute them as a way of bolstering their place, but also guaranteeing loyalty to the state. 

So the model exists; it’s not a new model. I mean, it’s a more sophisticated variation. There is a political movement, an independent political movement that has very strong Islamic roots, which I think also actually consolidate or solidify this push, right? If Ra’am is first and foremost an Islamist organization, then Palestine as a national space is secondary to Palestine as an Islamic space in their creation. So for me, the move that Abbas makes is not as radical as some might argue, and it is not as new as he might argue. 

He didn’t invent anything by saying, let’s just play within the system. Be quiet and not rock the boat and take what the state gives us and get our streets fixed and our housing crisis fixed. The problem is it’s a model that failed, because in the government he was in, he got money theoretically, but that money, most of it didn’t come. There was a lot of investment in planning, for instance. I’m very familiar with the planning side of it. But we also saw that Orit Strouk and her party were able to dominate the planning apparatus in the state and have now been actually undermining the plans that have been in the works for years. 

That government that Mansour Abbas sat in was until this government, the worst government since the Second Intifada. I mean, it’s the government that killed the most Palestinians. It’s the government that destroyed the most houses in the West Bank. It’s the government, and in East Jerusalem, it’s the government that destroyed more houses inside Israel of Palestinian citizens. And Abbas is trying to sell this as a model for salvation. He’s willing to give up the very hard -earned national collective rights and national and collective structure that has been created for pittance. 

And he’s not even guaranteed that, right? Like, again, what was given by the former government was taken by this government very easily. So I think it’s a very, it’s a Faustian bargain that he’s getting us into, but I think people’s desperation makes it appealing. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman 

One of the things that Israel’s liberal defenders really love to point out is that Palestinian citizens have experienced considerable socioeconomic mobility and are now sort of indispensable in sectors like medicine and law, which you alluded to a bit earlier. And there is a kind of surface -level truth to that narrative, even if it coexists with the kind of profound structural inequality and political repression that we’re seeing. But I want to ask, how does this transformation affect Palestinian society and political life? Has greater economic integration changed the way that Palestinians relate to the state? 

Leena Dallasheh 

I don’t know if I would go as far as calling it economic integration. I mean, the fact is, if you look at the campaign against doctors, you understand that we’re crucial. We are 22 % of the doctors in the country. We’re crucial for the medical system. The medical system, which actually has shortage of doctors, desperately needs us, and yet actually goes after us. So I would be very careful of calling that integration. 

I also want to mention that we actually subsidize the state. So this argument that like, oh, look at all those doctors, the state is making it, where do these doctors study? Abroad. The vast majority of those doctors study abroad. Historically, in the Eastern Bloc, when Israel almost completely blocked Palestinians from studying medicine. And now, in other parts of the world, in the Eastern Bloc, former Eastern Bloc, and other places, from Palestinian’s pockets. That’s millions and millions of dollars that Palestinians pay for doctors to be trained to come to Israel and work. So the state is not doing us a favor. Our success is despite the state, not because of the state. And that’s really important to highlight. I think, in the like neoliberal bubble that we were living in before October 7, some people thought we were more integrated, some people thought we had more power, but we also haven’t been able to leverage that power, maybe because people did think that we are privileged, right? We have all these doctors, we have all these lawyers, and all these high professionals. We even got integrated into the IT field, into high tech and all that. And then October 7th has proven that a folly. Now, to me, the lesson is organize, organize, organize, organize. The way doctors could have actually used and leveraged their power, their disproportionate representation, I mean, you know, and you’d think that we would be able to leverage it, but we weren’t even able to mobilize it to protect doctors. And the reason is because there is no collective building, there are no unions almost, there are no body, representative bodies. There is no organizing for a collective power that would then be able to mobilize this force, right? If there was a, I don’t know, a Palestinian doctors association, it could be, you know, the day after the attack on the Rambam medical staff, you know, this whole false claim that they mistreated a soldier or then the libel that they poison patients that Channel 14 has been spreading. 

They could have done, you know, like, I’m not going to say a day strike, but a two-hour strike that would actually show the system how much it needs us. But we don’t have that power. No one can make that decision. And unfortunately, it’s the same in all the other fields. I mean, there’s a lot of complaints about the higher follow-up committee, and a lot of it is justified. And, you know, like this jumping into declaring a strike every time to protest something is useless, because unlike the past, you don’t have the political leverage, you don’t have the influence, you don’t have the infrastructure to get people to strike. You know, back in the day when there was a decision to strike, there were people who went and blocked the villages, the entrances, the roads, so that the workers can’t go to work. You know, there was someone who can basically show and lead, and we’re not there. We don’t have any political structures that are on the ground in any meaningful way. 

How many branches of parties do any of these parties have? I mean, you know, the strength of Ra’am as an Islamic movement, it’s in the mosques, right? It has a built-in force. This is something that is a part of the strength and success of Islamic movements in other places as well, is that there’s only so much you can do as a state, as a structure, to prevent the mosque. So the mosque is going to be there, structurally. 

But the mosque is not being mobilized politically. I mean, during the genocide, as it was ongoing, I would listen, I would hear the Friday sermons and nothing, not a word. And, you know, they’re employees of the state. Their salaries are paid by the state. So I wouldn’t expect too much, but even that space is devoid of politics. 

And we have to repoliticize the street. We have to repoliticize our society. We have to educate and mobilize. And that’s the failure of the Palestinian political parties. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

I want to think about the past three years just for a second, because Palestinian citizens of Israel, as you’ve sort of continued to articulate throughout this interview, have had to watch the destruction of Gaza while facing, you know, extraordinary restrictions on their ability to speak out against it. And we did see this almost immediately after October 7th, particularly, as you said, on university campuses where students were, Palestinian students, were suspended, expelled over social media posts, sometimes posts, you know, about things as innocuous as, for example, a religious expression, a recent report came from the human rights organization, the legal human rights organization, Adalah, which documented what amounts to kind of two separate disciplinary tracks, one for Jewish students and another one for Palestinians. And maybe we can kind of zoom out, considering all of this, how has this period of the last three years affected the meaning and the actual substance of Palestinian citizenship in Israel? 

Leena Dallasheh 

That’s a good question. I think there’s some regrouping happening, and it’s happening within the context of the elections. Unfortunately, it was mired in some petty squabbles for recreating the Joint Lists, which undermined or obscured the actual political, substantive difference that, to me, justifies not running together. To me, actually there is a very clear difference in the political perception, in the political project that the two parts represent. But unfortunately, very late in the game, there is, it seems, a little bit more of a growing awareness of what’s at stake in the way that people are understanding, again, maybe not explicitly, and maybe we need to make it more explicitly, but what Palestinians fought for in the 1950s and 1960s, which is how to create a substantive Palestinian citizenship within Israel, one that is not only formal, in which we are paraded to the polls and photographed to the world to see Israel’s liberalism without any guarantees or even protections, let alone rights. 

And I think that Palestinians today, in the aftermath of the genocide in Gaza, in the aftermath of our lack of ability our desperate lack of ability to protest it and to make a difference. I think, I hope that Palestinians understand that we need to fight to maintain the rights that were hard -earned and to maintain the space. One of the lessons I take from the period I study in the 50s is that even though Palestinians failed in most of the concrete struggles that they led at the period, what they succeeded in is creating and expanding the space for Palestinian protest and expression within Israel, the space that then was used by the following generations to further expand their political participation, the meaning of their citizenship within the state, to continue to force the state to take seriously the promise of citizenship that we live within. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

One of the things that we’re seeing, or a few of the things that we’re seeing alongside the genocide in Gaza, is the accelerating annexation. of the West Bank and ethnic cleansing and some of the tactics that we traditionally associate with the occupied territories, are increasingly appearing inside of the Green Line. You also alluded to this a little bit at the beginning of the interview. So we’ve seen West Bank settlers, you know, in the last two months establishing an outpost near the Palestinian town of Majd al-Krum in the North to graze livestock on Palestinian land. So what does this episode kind of tell us about the relationship between Palestinians in the West Bank and Palestinians with Israeli citizenship? Like, how should we think about this political distinction now that these tactics are increasingly spilling over? 

Leena Dallasheh  

Yeah. I want to say first that the outpost in Majd al-Krum is not the first one, so there’s an outpost next to Eilabun called Ramat Arbel.

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

And where is this exactly? 

Leena Dallasheh
It’s in the Galilee. This was established early on during this current government, or reestablished by settlers. The settler institution all visited it. There was a court order to evacuate it, and then it was canceled. The model has already ongoing, right? 

And it is a model exactly of how outposts started in the West Bank. So what happens is that, if you think about it, Israel took the military government structure that it created against us into the West Bank. And now the settlers are bringing back the West Bank legal structure and or lack thereof into our spaces. Because for the state, we’re all Arabs, right? Not Palestinians, but we’re all Arabs. And we’re all dispensable, and our space, which has already shrunk significantly — only 4 percent of the land within Israel is owned by Palestinians now, compared to less than 10 percent that the Zionist movement owned in 1948. You know, the surface of the Palestinian cities, the areas under their control, is so narrow to begin with, and still Israel feels the need through this project of settlement, because I don’t think settlers are independent; they are an arm of a state. And now they’re using, because the citizenship has guaranteed us some protections, they’re using this unofficial arm of the state to undermine the little bit of rights, the little bit of space that we live in. It’s still different. 

The West Bank is still under direct military control, and Palestinians in the West Bank don’t have citizenship and lack any protection. But I think in the ideal of the Israeli extreme right, which has now expanded to kind of become a little bit more of a center-right attitude. The ideal is not for the Palestinians in the occupied territories to get citizenship, but the ideal is that we become in the same status of Palestinians in the occupied territories. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

And in a way, maybe it’s misleading to think about the phenomenon the way that I phrased the question, which is that the tactics are spilling over from the West Bank to within the Green Line because, as you pointed out, the military government started here. 

Leena Dallasheh 

Yeah, I think there’s a dynamic thing, which is rooted in the fact that Israel is a settler colonial state. It is based on settler colonial policy and practices of appropriating resources and land from the indigenous population for the benefit of the settler population. This has been true between ‘48 to ‘67. It has been true since ‘67. Israel was never not a settler colonial state in any day of its existence. But it has fluctuated, right? 

The settler colonialism doesn’t mean we know everything. but it tells us there’s a pattern and there’s a goal that the structure works within. And there’s times where it felt less embattled or less in danger and allowed more space for Palestinians’ rights. And now it is developing an extreme version of the siege mentality that it has lived, which has justifiable historical roots that have nothing to do with us Palestinians. But with this increased siege mentality, which is produced, in part, by the interests of the right, right? Like, they create the hype. 

They create this kind of—they constantly have to produce it. If you see how many times Netanyahu repeats the whole, you know, Iran, Palestinians, you know, and the jumbling of those, or all these things, you know that there’s a political project of creating this siege mentality, right? It’s not a random thing. But with that intensification, the space for our citizenship shrinks and the settler colonial impulse of domination and exclusion, even to the extreme of ethnic cleansing, increases. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

Maybe we can wrap it up by trying to do a bit of a history of the present, which is always kind of a difficult task. But in the introduction, I spoke a little bit about some of the defining moments, you know, since 1948, that have changed Palestinian citizens of Israel’s relationship to the state, including the Kafr Qasim massacre, which we’re now coming up on the 50th anniversary. 1967, Land Day, Oslo, the October 2000 killings. Do you think that we’re living through another historical juncture? And what makes this moment different, if anything? 

Leena Dallasheh 

I mean, I’m a Marxist historian. This is a conjuncture that has a lot of potential, but I’m also a historian, so I don’t know how we can assess it as it’s happening. I think October 7 was a decisive moment, and I think we are living in the conjuncture that was created as of October 7. I think the upcoming elections are going to decisive in how this historical moment takes shape. If we go out and vote en masse, we can block the extreme right and shift the current trajectory. 

If we fail to do so, the decisive plan of Smotrich is going to get a massive backwind. And I really, really hope people can understand how fast the structure in the West Bank has been changed by the current government — how much what we used to call the crawling annexation has turned into full-blown annexation, not only through what we see on the ground, but also through the complete reshaping of the legal structure that governs the West Bank in ways that enable the annexation effectively and legally, de jure and de facto. And again, Smotrich is not subtle. He says, I’m going to do the same thing here, so I think we need to be very aware that we are agents; we are not subject to the state. We have been active agents in resisting the settler colonial structures and the state’s attempts, even in the hardest times under the military government, in the shadow of the Nakba. And we need to take this agency seriously. The least that this can be done is through voting. The day after the voting, we have to go back to the drawing board, and we have to reconfigure: how do we reproduce the political structures or re-envision. 

It doesn’t have to be going back, but the past definitely, the history gives us a model, an aspiration, but we have to reconfigure a political structure that can be there to protect us, to defend our citizenship, to guarantee our baqa’ because then, as it was then, it is today under threat. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

Thank you so much, Leena. You’ve given us a lot to think about today. 

Leena Dallasheh 

Thank you. 

Dikla Taylor-Sheinman

This episode was produced by Jennifer Cutler with help from the +972 editorial team. 

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